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Abstract In the United Kingdom, the question of how
much information is required to be given to patients
about the benefits and risks of proposed treatment re-
mains extant. Issues about whether healthcare resources
can accommodate extended shared decision-making
processes are yet to be resolved. COVID-19 has now
stepped into this arena of uncertainty, adding more
complexity. U.K. public health responses to the pan-
demic raise important questions about professional stan-
dards regarding how the obtaining and recording of
consent might change or be maintained in such emer-
gency conditions, particularly in settings where equip-
ment, medicines, and appropriately trained or special-
ized staff are in short supply. Such conditions have
important implications for the professional capacity
and knowledge available to discuss the risks and bene-
fits of and alternatives to proposed treatment with pa-
tients. The government’s drive to expedite the recruit-
ment to wards of medical students nearing the end of
their studies, as well as inviting retired practitioners
back into practice, raises questions about the ability of
such healthcare providers to engage fully in shared
decision-making.
This article explores whether the legal duty on
healthcare practitioners to disclose the material risks of
a proposed medical treatment to a patient should be
upheld during pandemic conditions or whether the pre-
eminence of patient autonomy should be partly
sacrificed in such exceptional circumstances. We argue
that measures to protect public health and to respect
autonomous decision-making are not mutually exclu-
sive and that there are good reasons to maintain profes-
sional standards in obtaining consent to treatment even
during acute pressures on public health systems.
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The U.K. Legal Position on Risk Disclosure
Strongly influenced by the seminal Australian case of
Rogers v Whitaker ([1992] 175 CLR 479), the landmark
decision in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board
([2015] UKSC 11 [87]) reaffirmed that U.K. healthcare
practitioners are under a duty to inform patients of the
material risks of a proposed treatment and of any rea-
sonable alternative or variant treatments. The Su-
preme Court rejected the old doctor-centred test
for materiality and adopted the test in Rogers,
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in the circumstances of the particular case, a rea-
sonable person in the patient’s position would be
likely to attach significance to the risk, or the
doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the
particular patient would be likely to attach signif-
icance to it. (Montgomery [2015] [87])
Montgomery was grounded in what the court saw as
wider developments in law, professional regulation, and
society that emphasized the importance of respecting
patient autonomy. In relation to risk disclosure, the court
held that the law should treat patients
so far as possible as adults who are capable of
understanding that medical treatment is uncertain
of success and may involve risks, accepting re-
sponsibility for the taking of risks affecting their
own lives, and living with the consequences of
their choices. (Montgomery [2015] [81])
Since Montgomery, healthcare professionals and
lawyers have been attempting to determine its parame-
ters. It represents as much a general philosophy (that
healthcare law must be patient -centred) as a detailed
account of the legal rule that it provides. The question of
howmuch information is required to be given to patients
about the benefits and risks of proposed treatment re-
mains uncertain, with subsequent court decisions
compounding a lack of clarity on the boundaries of the
duty (Devaney et al. 2019).
COVID-19 has exacerbated this uncertainty, adding
complexity and increasing pressures on resources. In the
face of insufficient numbers of appropriately trained or
specialized staff to cope with the demands the pandemic
would place on the system, the government widened the
net of possible healthcare providers in the Coronavirus
Act 2020.1 This has resulted in the recruitment of retired
practitioners (BBCNews 2020) and students nearing the
end of their studies, as well as staff who had moved on
to other sectors, and the retraining and relocating of
existing providers.
Questions can legitimately be raised about whether
these groups of practitioners have sufficient up-to-date
knowledge and experience about the material risks
posed by proposed treatments to engage fully in shared
decision-making with patients. Should patients be ex-
pected to forgo their right to risk disclosure under these
circumstances, whether in relation to treatment for
COVID-19 symptoms or any other condition? We con-
sider this in relation to two aspects of the capacity to
discuss the risks and benefits of and alternatives to
proposed treatment with patients: first, a lack of the
skills required to do so; and second, the extreme condi-
tions under which such attempts might be made.
Requisite Knowledge
In law, the position is that patients are entitled to have
standards of care upheld even by practitioners of relative
inexperience. Indeed, it should be noted that much of this
is settled law from as long ago as the mid-1980s, when
the standard criticism was that the law was too generous
to doctors. In Wilsher v Essex AHA ([1987] QB 730
(CA)), the majority of the Court of Appeal held that the
standard of care is to be measured by the task to be done,
not the attributes of the person undertaking the task such
as inexperience. Glidewell LJ noted that inexperienced
colleagues could and would be expected to seek the
advice of more experienced colleagues where necessary.
In doing so it is highly likely that they will be found to
have discharged their duty of care (Wilsher at 774).
More recently, this position was confirmed by the
Court of Appeal in FB v Princess Alexandra Hospital
NHS Trust ([2017] EWCA Civ 334), which held that
where a doctor in a particular post fails to exercise the
degree of skill required for the task, they will breach the
standard of care.
The courts therefore see the correct standard to apply as
relating to the act performed rather than the actor under-
taking it. Inexperience will not lower the standard and nor
will more than average experience elevate it (FB at [63]).
These principles apply to informed consent as much as
they do to diagnostic and treatment decisions. This is
rooted in the courts’ view of patient expectations of good
quality treatment. But that does not mean that such evalu-
ations are context-free, as we demonstrate below.
Battle Conditions
If the relative experience of the practitioner is irrelevant
to the standard of care patients can expect, will the
conditions in which they are being treated affect it?
Wilsher is again instructive here, as the standard of care
to be met in “battle conditions”was considered (Wilsher
at 749). Mustill LJ held that “[a]n emergency may1 See sections 2–5 and schedules 1–4.
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overburden the available resources, and, if an individual
is forced by circumstances to do too many things at
once, the fact that he does one of them incorrectly
should not lightly be taken as negligence” (Wilsher at
749). Again, this approach has received support more
recently. In Mulholland v Medway NHS Foundation
Trust ([2015] EWHC 268 (QB)), a case relating to
alleged negligence in a busy accident and emergency
department (A&E), it was stated that, “[t]he assessment
of breach of duty is not an abstract exercise but one
formed within a context” ([90]). The reasonable nurse is
one “who operates in a busy A&E which has a proce-
dure which the nurse will follow for streaming and
which does not contemplate an exhaustive diagnosis
being formed” (Mulholland [90]). Similarly, busy
A&E doctors:
do not have the luxury of long and mature consid-
eration. They take decisions at short notice in a
pressurised environment … the standard of care
… must be calibrated in a manner reflecting real-
ity. (Mulholland [101])
This also applies in relation to informed consent. The
decision in Montgomery was in large part based on the
General Medical Council’s (GMC) consent guidance
(2008, ¶23–25, currently under review), which acknowl-
edges the importance of context in what is and is not
feasible to expect of doctors. Put simply, nobody expects
that the consent process will be the same for an emergency
tracheotomy at the roadside following a road traffic acci-
dent as it would be for elective surgery. By parity of
reasoning, there may be circumstances in the pandemic
that constitute “battle conditions,” where it will not be
possible for doctors to meet the Montgomery standard of
disclosure without risking people’s lives and health.
Ethical and regulatory guidelines published since the
emergence of the pandemic also support this position. The
BritishMedical Association reassures doctors that they are
unlikely to be criticized for care where their decisions are
reasonable in the circumstances (British Medical
Association 2020). In its ethical guidance on consent
published in the light of COVID-19, the GMC has reiter-
ated that the onus is on doctors to act “reasonably and
responsibly” in the given circumstances and that they
should ensure patients have the time and support to con-
sider material risks “as far as possible” (General Medical
Council 2020). Their joint statement with the chiefmedical
officers of the four nations of the United Kingdom
acknowledges the challenging circumstances likely to arise
in pandemic circumstances and confirms that professional
regulators will take these into account in any dealings with
their members (Atherton et al. 2020).
Even if a doctor were to be found to have breached
their duty of care in a negligence claim, a claimant
would still face the hurdle of establishing that the breach
caused a compensable harm. This would require them to
prove on the balance of probabilities that had they been
made aware of the material risks, they would have
decided not to undergo the proposed treatment, a noto-
riously challenging element to prove. Additionally, in
some urgent cases, doctors are entitled to withhold
information in order to protect the patient. The Supreme
Court in Montgomery recognized two such instances:
one where there is a necessity because treatment is
required but the patient cannot consent due, for exam-
ple, to unconsciousness and the other where the thera-
peutic exception applies because disclosure would cause
the patient serious harm (Montgomery [2015] [88]).
In sum then, a doctor is unlikely to be found negli-
gent in such exceptional circumstances. The level of
skill and experience will not, in law, justify a failure to
disclose material risks, but extreme working conditions
can. Can this be justified ethically? Must autonomy be
sacrificed for the greater good?
Individual v Public Health
It might be thought that at the heart of the issue as to
whether professional standards on the obtaining and
recording of consent should be lowered in emergency
conditions lies a question about whether the pre-
eminence of patient autonomy should be upheld or
sacrificed to other, more communitarian, principles
more typical of public health policy such as solidarity
or reciprocity but with which they might seem to clash.
It has been argued (Dawson 2010) that a slavish
devotion to the pre-eminence of autonomy in bioethics
has crowded out other important values which arise in
public health considerations. However, we argue that
the framing of autonomy as being in conflict with the
principles of public health ethics and law fails to reflect
more modern understandings of the wider healthcare
benefits of respecting individual choice in healthcare.
In fact, both are intended to achieve the same overarch-
ing aim. Public health has been said to be a concept
which “accounts for positive states of well-being”
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(Coggon and Gostin 2020, 199), its job being “to im-
prove underlying conditions of and for health” (Coggon
and Gostin 2020, 200). Public health law has been
described as “those aspects of law, policy, and regula-
tion that advance or place constraints upon the protec-
tion and promotion of health (howsoever understood)
within, between, and across populations” (Coggon,
Syrett, and Viens 2017, 72). We argue that the same
goes for respecting autonomy. Indeed, as the GMC
(2008, ¶3) notes: “[f]or a relationship between doctor
and patient to be effective, it should be a partnership
based on openness, trust and good communication.”
The non-exclusivity of public health ethics and autono-
my is also reflected in ethical guidance published by the
Royal College of Physicians, which postulates that ac-
tions and decision which are “fair, reciprocal, respectful
and equitable” can reflect the incorporation of public
health ethics into clinical ethics in the context of the
current pandemic (RCP 2020).
We argue that respect for autonomy is not necessarily
incompatible with the extensive public health measures
currently in place and does not impede the goals of those
measures. Although there might be exceptional circum-
stances where these values clash, the law is nuanced
enough to take account of this by making an exception to
the Montgomery standard of disclosure in cases of “battle
conditions.”We are confident that doctors will continue to
act in partnership with patients as much as the situation
allows, though we also acknowledge that some of the
particular challenges inherent in the current situation mean
that context is more important than ever and that what is
feasible depends on the circumstances at the time.
Conclusion
The willingness of practitioners at the very beginning
and end of their careers to step in to provide care and
treatment to patients is laudable. In concert with their
colleagues already practicing, some of whom have been
retrained or relocated beyond their usual expertise, we
can imagine that none of them will do so in the hope or
expectation that patients will be harmed by any negli-
gent actions. However, the provision of treatment in-
volves risks. To the extent that they are material, patients
are entitled to be informed of these. Maintaining usual
professional standards of care in this regard as far as is
possible in pandemic conditions will help to maintain
trust in the profession and contribute to the aims of
healthcare and public health law and policy.
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